• Sources: discussion, discussion
  • Summary: The researcher's proof of concept prepares a CLFS log at a path the user controls. It waits for a privileged process, Defender's update service in the published code, to open the log. Object manager symbolic links then redirect the companion .cnpf file the driver creates as SYSTEM. Systems are in scope when the CLFS authentication Mode is 0 or 1, which is the default on established installs. 78researchlab confirmed that the exploit works but found it unreliable. No CVE, patch or in-the-wild use has been reported.
  • Why it matters: Windows build agents and developer machines are exposed to local privilege escalation until Microsoft responds, and disabling CLFS authentication brings back older memory corruption bugs.
  • Background: The Common Log File System driver has 10 entries in CISA's known exploited catalog. Microsoft added HMAC authentication of log files in October 2025 so the driver would parse only logs it wrote itself. SignDrop attacks that mitigation's file creation logic rather than the log parser.