• Sources: primary, primary
  • Summary: RUSTSEC-2026-0524 says a quinn client kept a Retry token without a length limit, so an oversized token makes release builds try to allocate more than 10 GiB and abort, and an on-path attacker who sees the first Initial packet can send it. RUSTSEC-2026-0523 says one MAX_STREAM_DATA frame naming a huge stream index opened every lower stream without a limit check, letting a peer hand accept_bi more than 2^40 streams. Both are fixed in quinn-proto 0.11.19, and versions before 0.11.0 are unaffected.
  • Why it matters: Any Rust service or client using quinn for QUIC or HTTP/3 should update to quinn-proto 0.11.19, since one flaw hits every outgoing connection.
  • Background: QUIC servers can answer a client's first Initial packet with a Retry packet that carries an address validation token, which the client must echo in later Initial packets. Initial datagrams are limited to 1200 bytes, so an unbounded token leaves no room for payload. RFC 9000 requires an endpoint to close the connection with STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR when a peer references streams beyond the advertised limit.