• Sources: primary, discussion
  • Summary: Aikido Security reports that from 2026-11-10 an attacker used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to open probe pull requests titled docs: dependency audit notes in 61,764 repositories, and the stealer ran in at least 1,806 of them. SafeDep counted 8,093 public repositories with malicious commits, either added to existing workflows or as npm postinstall hooks. The stealer takes Actions secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC tokens, AI keys and cloud credential files, can rewrite AWS role trust policies and adds wfx-ci- federated credentials to Azure AD apps, and reached a Packagist package, Go modules and 28 WebdriverIO repositories.
  • Why it matters: Any repository you can write to may have run the stealer, so check for wfx-docs branches and runs with missing numbers, then rotate every workflow secret and audit cloud trust policies.
  • Background: GitHub Actions workflows run with the repository's secrets and can exchange a short-lived OIDC token for cloud sessions through workload identity federation, so a single malicious workflow commit can reach AWS, Azure or GCP without any stored key. Attackers who add a new trust relationship or federated credential keep access after the original tokens are revoked. Aikido says the accounts used overlap heavily with those hit in October's GhostAction wave but does not yet attribute both to one actor.
  • Comments: The Hacker News found new probe pull requests from wfx-docs branches opened between 05:04 and 05:38 UTC on 2026-11-12, after Aikido's search ended, and corrected its article after a second analysis found a third exfiltration server and a Telegram channel.