• Sources: discussion
  • Summary: eMudhra's full incident report says an in-house Python script used in an April 2025 key ceremony truncated eight ECDSA CA keys to one byte, and also read eight RSA CA private keys out of the HSM into process memory, so the company cannot show they met its own key-handling rules. It revoked the eight RSA CAs late last week with the reason cessationOfOperation, and they had issued 195 listed certificates. Microsoft starts removing the remaining ten eMudhra roots on 2026-11-16, Chrome and Firefox stop trusting G1 certificates issued after that date, and Apple ends trust in all G1 certificates on 2026-11-30.
  • Why it matters: Clients that skip Certificate Transparency, such as Electron updaters and command-line tools, need updated trust stores before the November root removals.
  • Background: An intermediate CA holds its own signing key under a root, so a weak or exposed intermediate key lets anyone mint trusted certificates until the intermediate is revoked and distrusted. Browsers that require Certificate Transparency would reject unlogged certificates, which is why the exposure falls mainly on software that does its own TLS validation. The original eight one-byte keys were revoked on 2026-10-18, and eMudhra announced its exit from publicly trusted TLS on 2026-10-22.
  • Follow-up: Microsoft root removal from 2026-11-16, eMudhra's CA key inventory by 2026-11-30, and KPMG's review by 2026-12-04.