• Sources: discussion
  • Summary: On 2026-11-09 attackers used Ethersphere's bee-worker automation account to publish bee-js 13.3.0, latest on npm for about 75 minutes, and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, live on GitHub for about 8.5 hours. Both fetch a payload that steals the Swarm node key and its plain-text password and installs a Go remote shell on Linux and macOS or ScreenConnect on Windows. Clean Swarm Desktop 0.56.3 is out, and signing jobs now need DevOps approval and run only from main.
  • Why it matters: Search lockfiles, caches and CI logs for @ethersphere/bee-js@13.3.0, and treat any machine or runner that installed it with scripts enabled as compromised.
  • Background: npm provenance links a package to the repository and workflow that built it, but it does not show that anyone reviewed the code. Here the project's real workflow built the malicious release, so provenance was valid. npm runs postinstall scripts automatically, so a project did not need to import the library for the loader to run.