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- Summary: SecurityWeek reports that DeepMind agents, supervised by cryptographers from UC San Diego and Inria, found that PKCS#1 v1.5 padding adds no protection once an attacker controls roughly half the signed block, and re-ran an earlier forgery on a 1024-bit key in 391 CPU core-years against 1,380. Two agents designed, ran and debugged the computation in under four days with about 20 human messages. A second, unimplemented algorithm makes factoring each additional 1024-bit key about 30 times cheaper after one upfront computation.
- Why it matters: Anything still signing with RSA-1024 through PKCS#11 devices such as HSMs has less margin than assumed, while 2048-bit and larger keys are unaffected.
- Background: PKCS#1 v1.5 is an older RSA padding scheme still common in hardware security module signing interfaces. The forgery needs about 4 billion chosen signing queries, does not recover the private key, and fails against devices that hash messages internally. Factoring one 1024-bit key is estimated at 500,000 to 1 million core-years.