• Sources: discussion
  • Summary: Wiz says an attacker with credentials for the AWS account Qubole's platform uses, 805246085872, assumed roles in multiple customers' accounts between 2026-10-14 and 2026-10-26. The attacker read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store values, tested the found credentials with TruffleHog, and copied S3 data. How the credentials were obtained is not disclosed, and Qubole and Idera had posted no statement.
  • Why it matters: Any account that ever connected Qubole should search CloudTrail from 2026-10-01 for AssumeRole calls from that account outside AWS, rotate reachable secrets, and add source IP conditions to vendor role trust policies.
  • Background: SaaS vendors that work inside a customer's AWS account usually get an IAM role whose trust policy lets the vendor's account assume it. The External ID guards against the confused deputy problem, but it is not a secret and appears in plain text in CloudTrail. If the vendor's own account is compromised, every customer role that still trusts it is exposed.