• Sources: primary, discussion
  • Summary: PwnEscape Part 2 shows a guest using host physical memory access, obtained through a Linux networking flaw from Part 1, to find its own page via EPT, recover the Firecracker process page tables, and rewrite the saved registers of a vCPU thread blocked in KVM_RUN. A serial port write made Firecracker call write on stderr with guest-chosen arguments, then resume normally. The test ran Firecracker 1.16.1 directly as root on host kernel 7.0.0-1011-aws with no jailer, and the authors say jailer deployments need separate assessment.
  • Why it matters: Agent sandboxes on Firecracker depend on host kernel patching and the jailer's privilege drop, not the VMM boundary alone.
  • Comments: The Hacker News thread debates how much the missing jailer, namespaces and seccomp limit real impact.