• Sources: primary
  • Summary: In a post published 2026-11-06, Christopher Patton, Tianyu Zhang and Bas Westerbaan write that Privacy Pass still relies on RSA and elliptic curves, so a quantum attacker could forge tokens at will, while its unlinkability is unconditional and survives. They describe a successor design called MOLE, Moderation Of unLinkable Endorsements, in which an anchor issues an endorsement that a client redeems with a moderator without revealing which anchor in the trusted anchor set issued it. They name size as the main obstacle, citing ML-DSA-44 signatures at 2,420 bytes against 64 bytes for ECDSA-P256, and point to the VOLE-in-the-Head zero-knowledge proof system from Baum et al., Crypto 2023, and the FAEST signature candidate as a route to decoupling parameter choice from protocol design.
  • Why it matters: Teams that depend on Privacy Pass tokens for rate limiting or private relays should expect a protocol change with far larger tokens.
  • Background: Privacy Pass issues a client blind signatures over messages the issuer never sees, so the client can later redeem a token that cannot be linked back to issuance. Apple's iCloud Private Relay and Cloudflare's Privacy Gateway use it to let proxied traffic prove legitimacy without identifying the user. Unlinkability that holds against any attacker, quantum or not, is an information-theoretic property, unlike unforgeability, which rests on hardness assumptions that quantum computers break.