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- Summary: OPSSHIELD says an attacker used compromised credentials on 2026-11-02 at 02:06 UTC to ship a malicious script in cPGuard 5.88.12 through 5.88.19, which collected /etc/shadow, root's my.cnf, shell history and SSH files and staged them on an OPSSHIELD licensing server. The attacker took at least 32 files, each tied to one customer server, and cPGuard 5.88.25 removes the backdoor. Admins should check /opt/cpguard/logs/install_log and rotate root passwords, database credentials, cloud tokens and SSH keys on affected servers.
- Why it matters: Security agents with root update channels are a supply chain path, and updating alone does not revoke copied credentials.
- Follow-up: OPSSHIELD's findings on how the update credentials were stolen and whether its support-access private key was exposed.