Skip to content- Sources: primary, discussion
- Summary: Reported 2026-08-06 and fixed 2026-10-07, the OAuth flow shared by Google's developer documentation sites set a roughly 1,200 byte Flask session cookie, and because Flask signs session cookies rather than encrypting them, the payload decoded to a pickle-serialized
oauth2client.client.OAuth2WebServerFlow object carrying the OAuth client_id and client_secret in plaintext. That client secret was also the Flask SECRET_KEY, so the author recomputed the itsdangerous signature offline, matched it byte for byte, then forged a session with an attacker-chosen CSRF token and a pickle under the matching flow key, which the callback passes to pickle.loads. Execution was demonstrated with a time.sleep reduce payload whose response times tracked the requested delay at 0, 3, 5 and 8 seconds, with negative controls for a missing cookie, a flipped signature byte and a missing flow entry, and because DevSite is a shared platform the key validated sessions on firebase.google.com, developer.android.com, source.android.com and docs.partner.android.com. - Why it matters: The chain is four independent mistakes stacked, a credential reused as a signing key, secrets in a client-held cookie, pickle across a client boundary, and one key shared across deployments, and each is checkable in a codebase today.