Skip to content- Sources: The Register, discussion
- Summary: The Register reports Zenity Labs reached the instance metadata service from an internet-exposed AgentCore agent with a single server-side request forgery prompt, because the Firecracker MicroVM did not isolate that service, and the default AgentCore role was scoped to every AgentCore resource in the region rather than to one agent. The credentials reached session transcripts, Secrets Manager, and agent memory writes that persistently hijack goals across future sessions. AWS moved AgentCore to IMDSv2 only by 2026-02-14 and closed the report as informative on 2026-04-12, Zenity Labs found the overpermissioned role still in place on 2026-06-22 and remediated only by 2026-09-29, and Amazon states the research misrepresents documented behaviour and would require developer error.
- Why it matters: A default agent role scoped to a whole region turns one exposed agent into account-wide credential access, and the memory writes outlive the session that created them.
- Follow-up: Whether AWS narrows the default AgentCore execution role in documentation as well as in the service, and whether Zenity Labs publishes its own write-up, which was not read for this item.