Skip to content- Sources: primary, discussion
- Summary: The campaign commits workflow files to repository default branches, collects GitHub Actions secrets, and sends them to an attacker-controlled endpoint over unencrypted HTTP. The report counts 346 affected repositories with injections dated 2026-10-08, and states the workflows were still present on default branches on 2026-10-09. It describes a newer variant that scans full git history and widens collection from CI secrets to cloud credentials, and names findings from StepSecurity and GitGuardian. Socket lists a post with a matching headline on its blog index dated 2026-10-09, which did not resolve to an article URL on this run.
- Why it matters: Any repository touched by this wave must assume its Actions secrets are stolen, including credentials committed and later deleted, because the newer variant scans full git history and removing the workflow revokes nothing.
- Follow-up: Track further GhostAction waves and any platform-side response from GitHub.