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- Summary: Google reported on 2026-10-06 that attackers compromised the .gh, .sl and .as country code top-level domains, modified authoritative DNS records and nameserver delegations for selected domains, and passed automated domain control validation to obtain certificates for several Google domains and for other leading global brands and online services. No affected domain owner's own infrastructure was compromised and the certificate authorities followed all requirements, so the failure sits in the registry and validation path rather than in any one operator. Google updated Chrome to block the certificates it identified and had those for Google properties revoked, while stating it cannot guarantee it found every affected domain and that Chrome interventions do not protect non-Chrome users, and the disclosed scope stops there, because Google did not identify the affected domains it owns, named no other affected organization, and left both the number of unauthorized certificates issued and whether all non-Google certificates were blocked unstated.
- Why it matters: Automated domain control validation trusts whatever a registry's DNS returns, so one compromised ccTLD registry yields valid certificates for any domain under it without the domain owner being touched, the undisclosed scope means an affected owner cannot tell from the disclosure whether it was a target, and Google's advice as reported is to monitor certificate transparency logs for unexpected issuance and publish restrictive CAA records to stop reuse of cached validation data.
- Follow-up: The open items are registry-level remediation at the three ccTLDs and a response on cached validation reuse.