• Sources: primary
  • Summary: Flatt Security reports that @subql/common 5.8.3 was published at 11:56 UTC on 2026-10-05 from a compromised CI pipeline, after an unsigned commit rewrote publish.yml, and was removed from npm about 50 minutes later at roughly 12:46 UTC, with 5.8.2 the latest known safe version. The package shipped through npm's GitHub Actions OIDC Trusted Publisher, so the npm publisher field read as GitHub Actions and provenance did not separate the malicious version from a legitimate release. The payload harvested AWS, GitHub, SSH, npm, Docker, Kubernetes and Vault credentials, read coding-agent configuration files including ~/.claude.json, ~/.claude/mcp.json and .kiro/settings/mcp.json, and is not stopped by disabling lifecycle scripts, because its warm() entry point also fires on require('@subql/common').
  • Why it matters: Anyone who installed 5.8.3 has to rotate AWS, GitHub, SSH, npm, Docker, Kubernetes and Vault credentials and kill any lingering manifest-cache.js --warm process.
  • Follow-up: Watch for npm or GitHub guidance on separating Trusted Publisher provenance from a compromised pipeline.