• Sources: primary, discussion
  • Summary: C2PA lets a signer mark byte ranges as excluded from the hash, and David Buchanan's post dated 2026-10-02 shows that a malicious signer can declare the entire file excluded, so a valid claim signature and a valid RFC 3161 trusted timestamp both attest to an empty string. He timestamped a photo of a lottery ticket before the draw, edited the winning numbers in afterwards, and every C2PA verification tool he tested accepted the result. The flaw is in the C2PA specification's exclusion feature rather than in a single implementation, so no patched version exists and the feature cannot simply be removed, because formats such as PNG need it for CRC32 fixups, and the mitigation Buchanan proposes is a per-format allowlist of exclusion ranges that verifiers enforce.
  • Why it matters: C2PA is the content-provenance standard camera vendors and AI tooling are adopting, and a signature covering zero bytes removes the one guarantee the standard exists to provide.
  • Follow-up: Watch for a C2PA specification change that requires verifiers to enforce per-format exclusion-range allowlists.