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- Summary: Haakon Wik Gulbrandsrud of Binary Security published the third part of his Azure API Connections series on 2026-10-02, and states the vulnerabilities in this part paid US$200,000 in bounties, with the series as a whole standing at five critical elevation-of-privilege findings in Azure, all now fixed. The root cause is architectural: requests reaching the shared API Management instance through ARM carry rights to every connection, so a path traversal in the DynamicInvoke payload reads another tenant's Key Vault secret, blacklisting paths left three undocumented sibling endpoints reachable, and DynamicList gave arbitrary writes against a victim's Azure SQL database until Microsoft blocked the endpoints outright. The fix validating the undocumented host.api.RuntimeUrl input ran before path normalization, so the traversal worked again, and the follow-up fix stopped validating the original RuntimeUrl path and reopened the first attack. Logic Apps API Connections is a hosted Azure service, so there is no customer-installable version range and no customer patching step: Microsoft applied all five fixes server-side.
- Why it matters: Consumption Logic Apps have implicit access to every Version 1 API Connection because there is no managed identity to authorize, so the backend token should be assumed to carry the full privileges of whoever created the connection.