• Sources: primary, discussion
  • Summary: The write-up describes read-only enforcement for the SQL Copilot agent implemented as a regex blocklist inside a checker class rather than as a database permission, defeated by assigning sp_executesql to a variable and calling EXEC on that variable. The escalation needs no prompt from the victim. A user holding ALTER on a single object can attach an AGENTS.md or CONSTITUTION.md extended property that Copilot later loads into its context and executes over a sysadmin connection. No affected or patched version range is published in the write-up, so there is no version number for an operator to check.
  • Why it matters: The control was an instruction to the model and a pattern match rather than a permission, so metadata a lower-privileged user can write becomes an execution path.
  • Follow-up: Whether other products that read agent config files out of a permissioned store carry the same gap between file trust and store permissions.